Change Management Over Financial Information: A Multi-Criteria Evaluation of System Change Controls Using Desirability Functions by Otero, Angel R et al.
Communications of the IIMA 
Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 1 
Change Management Over Financial Information: A Multi-Criteria 
Evaluation of System Change Controls Using Desirability 
Functions 
Angel R. Otero 
Florida Institute of Technology, aotero@fit.edu 
Christian Sonnenberg 
Florida Institute of Technology 
Ivonne Delgado-Perez 
Florida Institute of Technology 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/ciima 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, 
Management Information Systems Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Otero, Angel R.; Sonnenberg, Christian; and Delgado-Perez, Ivonne () "Change Management Over Financial 
Information: A Multi-Criteria Evaluation of System Change Controls Using Desirability Functions," 
Communications of the IIMA: Vol. 18 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/ciima/vol18/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Communications of the IIMA by an authorized editor of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please 
contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
Change Management Over Financial Information: A Multi-Criteria Evaluation of 
System Change Controls Using Desirability Functions 
Cover Page Footnote 
The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their time and valuable review which contributed 
favorably to the quality of our manuscript. 
This article is available in Communications of the IIMA: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/ciima/vol18/iss1/1 
 
 
Change Management Over Financial Information: A Multi-
Criteria Evaluation of System Change Controls Using Desirability 
Functions 
 
Angel R. Otero 
Florida Institute of Technology, USA 
aotero@fit.edu 
 
Christian Sonnenberg 
Florida Institute of Technology, USA 
csonnenb@fit.edu 
 
Ivonne Delgado-Perez 
Florida Institute of Technology, USA 
idelgado@fit.edu 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The increasing complexity of information technology, attacks on confidential 
information, and the passing of new laws and regulations have shifted the focus 
around internal controls in organizations. Particularly, general information 
technology controls related to change management (i.e., system change controls) 
are critical in ensuring the integrity, completeness, and reliability of financial 
information. The literature points to various evaluation methods for these controls 
to determine which ones to implement. However, these methods do not necessarily 
consider relevant organization constraints, preventing the inclusion of required 
controls or the exclusion of unnecessary controls. This paper proposes a novel 
approach, using Desirability Functions, for evaluating system change controls 
providing management with a measurement that is representative of the overall 
quality of each control based solely on organizational goals and objectives. 
Through a case assessment, the approach is proven successful in providing a way 
for measuring the quality of system change controls in organizations. 
 
Keywords: Internal controls, General IT Controls, change management, system 
change controls, desirability functions 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  The increasing complexity of information technology (IT), attacks on confidential 
information, and the passing of new laws and regulations have all shifted the focus 
around internal controls in organizations. Today, more than ever, organizations 
 
 
require internal controls to be well-designed, implemented, and to operate 
effectively and in compliance with laws and regulations (Lavion, 2018). Internal 
controls refer to procedures and activities implemented by management to mitigate 
the risks that could prevent a company from achieving its business objectives 
(Deloitte, 2018;  GTAG 8, 2019). 
 
  Business goals and objectives, such as, reliability of the entity’s financial 
reporting, effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations are common objectives that are constantly 
threatened in an organization (Otero, 2018; Otero, Ejnioui, Otero, & Tejay, 2011). 
Internal controls should be in place and monitored to ensure the goals and 
objectives above are met and that any potential concerns regarding the entity’s 
going concern are reduced or eliminated.  
 
  Internal controls related to IT or General IT Controls (GITC) aid in the protection 
of business operations, particularly, by securing the integrity, completeness, and 
reliability of financial information, as well as of any other system functionality 
underlying business processes (Deloitte, 2018; Otero, 2015a). GITC are policies 
and procedures that support the effective functioning of applications, including the 
operation of automated controls embedded in the applications, the integrity of 
reports generated from the applications, and the security of data housed within the 
applications. Based on Deloitte (2018) and Cooke (2019), effective design, 
implementation, and operation of GITC are critical and of utmost importance to 
major company’s stakeholders (e.g., owners, investors, regulators, audit 
committees, management, auditors, etc.) for the following reasons:  
 
• Business processes, controls, and financial data relevant to financial 
information are often relied upon by stakeholders in order to manage the 
business and make strategic decisions. 
• Effective operations of controls around the company’s IT environment 
ensure adequate processing and reporting of financial data, as well as 
compliance with relevant laws and regulations.  
• Automation of business processes and financial transactions is becoming 
increasingly important and relied upon. Automated controls rely on GITC 
to ensure they function properly. 
• Cyber security is a broad business risk which extends to financial 
information. 
 
  Inefficiencies or ineffective GITC (deficiencies) may prevent a company from 
generating complete and accurate financial reports (Masli, Richardson, Watson, & 
Zmud, 2016; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2007). Deficiencies in GITC, if not timely 
 
 
identified and addressed, may also impact the overall functioning of internal 
controls, result in delayed financial closing process, increase audit costs, and impact 
internal decisions and/or public disclosure, ultimately affecting the reputation and 
brand of the company. 
 
  GITC commonly include controls over (1) data center and network operations 
(also referred to as information systems operations); (2) information or access 
security; and (3) change management. Change management includes controls 
around the areas of system software acquisition, change and maintenance, program 
change, and application system acquisition, development and maintenance. These 
change management controls altogether may collectively be referred to as system 
change controls or SCC.  
 
  SCC are critical in ensuring the security, integrity, completeness, and reliability 
of financial information (Keef, 2019; Otero, 2015a; GTAG 2, 2019; Otero, Tejay, 
Otero, & Ruiz, 2012; Ejnioui, Otero, Tejay, Otero, & Qureshi, 2012). SCC include 
controls over each of the relevant technology elements within the entity’s IT 
environment, including the application system, database, operating system and 
network. Examples of SCC include change request approvals; application and 
database upgrades; and network infrastructure monitoring and security; among 
others. Given the significance and rapid integration of IT systems with business 
processes, SCC must be in place in order to maintain the completeness and accuracy 
of information, as well as the reliability of business processes within the 
organization. 
 
Change Management Process and Challenges 
 
  As stated before, change management is one of the three major GITC areas that 
assess organization’s policies and procedures related to application systems in order 
to support the effective functioning of application controls (Otero, 2018). 
According to the Information Technology Infrastructure Library Change 
Management (2016), change management is a process designed to understand and 
minimize risks while making changes within the IT environment. The objective of 
change management is to enable the IT environment to allow rapid change while 
minimizing the possibility of disruption. The decision about whether to approve 
and implement a proposed IT change is sometimes a strategic one, and therefore it 
is expected that the change management process be adequately managed and 
controlled.  
 
  Changes in the IT environment, including systems and applications, can result 
from a new law or regulation requirement, or from an update needed to enhance the 
 
 
current system’s functionality (Masli et al., 2016). In both cases, before 
implementation in the live or production environment, changes must be evaluated, 
documented, approved, developed, and tested in an adequate and controlled manner 
(Hornstein, 2015; Mitra & Mishra, 2016). However, there are always several 
challenges when carrying out this process.  
 
  For instance, implementation of changes directly into an application system may 
override already existing automated application controls for particular financial 
transactions or certain set of transactions, leading to serious data accuracy and 
integrity issues. An example would be the direct implementation of a change that 
affects the system’s calculation of depreciation for recorded fixed assets. The direct 
change may had not been adequately tested or evaluated, resulting in an inaccurate 
posting of depreciation. Moreover, if this change is implemented by year end, it 
may lead to incorrect representation of financial information. Another example 
would be the direct implementation of emergency changes. According to Pillai, 
Pundir, and Ganapathy (2014), an emergency change is any change, major or 
minor, that must be made quickly as an immediate fix, without following standard 
change management procedures (e.g., appropriate documentation, rigorous testing, 
etc.) prior to implementation in production. Management must approve such 
changes before they are undertaken or implemented. These types of direct changes 
are typically not documented or tested prior to their implementation, leading to an 
adverse impact which would be difficult to roll-back and trail. 
 
  Another challenge in the change management process involves the 
implementation of unauthorized changes which may harm the production 
environment, causing severe data integrity issues. Unauthorized changes may lead 
to incomplete implementations, leaving out critical functionality. Unauthorized 
changes may also result in the processing of incorrect financial data, ultimately 
opening up opportunities for fraud (Lavion, 2018). Proper authorization of changes 
prior to their development and implementation will bring all relevant stakeholders 
on board and ensure that the intended change is aligned and consistent with business 
goals, objectives, and/or requirements.  
 
  A third challenge relates to inadequate segregation of duties. A well-controlled 
change management process monitors and ensures that there is proper segregation 
between who initiates the change, who approves the change, who develops the 
change, and who implements the change in the production environment. Having the 
same individual with granted access to analyze, design, construct, test, and 
implement a change in the live environment may result in overlooking errors, 
implementing incorrect and incomplete changes, etc. Per Otero (2019a) and Otero 
(2014), individuals with complete access to develop and implement changes into 
 
 
production will trigger many dangerous systems’ risks, including but not limited 
to: unauthorized access to programs or data; unauthorized remote access; inaccurate 
information; erroneous or falsified data input; incomplete, duplicate, and untimely 
processing; communications system failure; inaccurate or incomplete output; and 
insufficient documentation. Segregation of duties certainly plays an important role 
in the entire change management process and must be effectively controlled. 
 
Current IT Environment 
 
  Throughout the years, organizations have experienced numerous system losses 
which have had a direct impact on their most valuable asset, information. Schwartz 
(1990) stated that losses related to confidential, sensitive, and/or financial 
information will continue to happen, and their effect will be devastated to 
organizations. Examples of information losses suffered by organizations result 
from fraud and economic crimes (i.e., white-collar crime), from altering and/or 
acquiring unauthorized access, from injecting malicious code, and from the 
inappropriate implementation of changes, all of which could result in inaccurate 
calculations, unreliable processing, incomplete recording of data, lost data, cutoff 
errors, and other misstatements of the accounting records (ISACA, 2011; Otero, 
Sonnenberg, & Bean, 2019; Otero, 2019b).  
 
  According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) (2019), white-collar 
crime or corporate fraud continues to be one of the FBI’s highest criminal priorities. 
Corporate fraud results in significant financial losses to companies and investors 
and continue causing immeasurable damage to the U.S. economy and investor 
confidence. FBI (2019) states that the majority of corporate fraud cases pursued 
mostly involve accounting schemes, such as: false accounting entries and/or 
misrepresentations of financial condition; fraudulent trades designed to inflate 
profits or hide losses; and/or illicit transactions designed to evade regulatory 
oversight. The above schemes are designed to deceive investors, auditors, and 
analysts about the true financial condition of a corporation or business entity (Otero, 
2015b). These schemes are often the result of weakly-implemented controls, 
particularly SCC (Keef, 2019; Otero, 2015a). SCC include controls over relevant 
technology elements such as financial application systems, databases, operating 
systems, and networks. Therefore, they must be in place to maintain complete and 
accurate financial information, as well as to safeguard against any potential 
manipulation or abuse of such relevant information.  
 
  Through manipulation of financial data, share price, or other valuation 
measurements, financial performance of a corporation may remain artificially 
inflated based on fictitious performance indicators provided to the investing public. 
 
 
To add to the above, in a Global Economic Crime Survey performed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2014), the views of more than 5,000 participants 
from over 100 countries were featured on the prevalence and direction of economic 
crime since 2011. The survey revealed that 54% of U.S. participants reported their 
companies experienced fraud or inconsistencies with their financial systems in 
excess of $100,000 with 8% reporting fraud in excess of $5 million. Moreover, the 
use of web applications (which has grown exponentially and benefitted many 
organizations) has also brought in security risks and vulnerabilities around financial 
information creating significant exposure for many organizations (ISACA, 2011; 
Thomé, Shar, Bianculli, & Briand, 2018). The alarming facts and figures above all 
point to an inadequacy in today's IT environment and serve as motivation for 
finding new ways to help organizations improve their capabilities for securing, 
managing, and controlling valuable information.   
 
  Currently, most of the challenges related to change management practices are 
addressed through the use of tools and technologies (Singh, Picot, Kranz, Gupta, & 
Ojha, 2013; Volonino & Robinson, 2004; Vaast, 2007). However, it is argued that 
these tools and technologies alone are not sufficient to address the change 
management-related problems just presented (Keef, 2019; Herath & Rao, 2009). 
To improve overall change management practices, organizations must evaluate 
(and thus implement) appropriate SCC that satisfy their specific security 
requirements (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Karyda, 
Kiountouzis, & Kokolakis, 2004). However, due to a variety of organizational-
specific constraints (e.g., cost, scheduling, resources availability, etc.), 
organizations do not have the luxury of selecting and implementing all required 
SCC. Therefore, the selection and implementation of SCC within organizations' 
business constraints become a non-trivial task.   
 
  This research proposes a novel approach for evaluating the most appropriate SCC 
based on organization specific criteria. The proposed approach uses Desirability 
Functions to quantify the desirability of each SCC taking into account benefits and 
penalties (restrictions) associated with implementing the SCC. This provides 
management with a measurement that is representative of the overall quality of each 
SCC based on organizational goals and objectives. The derived quality 
measurement can be used as the main metric for selecting SCC.  
 
BACKGROUND WORK 
 
  Various reasons have been put forth for explaining the lack of effectiveness in the 
evaluation, selection, and implementation process of internal controls. Wood 
(2000) argues that the implementation of controls in organizations may constitute 
 
 
a barrier to progress. For instance, participants from the ICIS 1993 conference panel 
indicated that the implementation of controls may slow down production thereby 
turning the employees’ work ineffective (Loch, Conger, & Oz, 1998). Employees 
may view controls as interrupting their day-to-day tasks (Post & Kagan, 2007) and 
may, therefore, tend to ignore implementing them in order to be effective and 
efficient with their daily job tasks. 
 
  According to Saint-Germain (2005), organizations are required to identify and 
implement appropriate controls to ensure adequate information security. 
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) place emphasis on the fact that “different 
organizations have different security needs, and thus different security 
requirements and objectives” (p. 344). Whitman, Towsend, and Aalberts (2001) 
also stress that there is no single information security solution that can fit all 
organizations. As a result, controls must be carefully selected to fit the specific 
needs of the organization. Identification and implementation of the most effective 
controls is a major step towards providing an adequate IT environment in 
organizations (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000). 
 
Previous Approaches in the Selection and Evaluation of SCC in Organizations 
 
  Based on Barnard and Von Solms (2000), the process of identifying (and 
selecting) the most effective SCC in organizations has been a challenge in the past, 
and plenty of attempts have been made to come up with the most effective way 
possible. Risk analysis and management (RAM) is just one example. RAM has 
been recognized in the literature as an effective approach to identify SCC (Barnard 
& Von Solms, 2000). RAM consists of performing business analyses as well as risk 
assessments, resulting in the identification of information security requirements 
(Barnard & Von Solms, 2000). RAM would then list the information security 
requirements as well as the proposed SCC to be implemented to mitigate the risks 
resulting from the analyses and assessments performed.  
 
  RAM, however, has been described as a subjective, bottom-up approach (Van der 
Haar & Von Solms, 2003), not taking into account organizations’ specific 
constraints. For example, through performing RAM, organizations may identify 50 
change management-related risks. Nonetheless, management may not be able to 
select and implement all necessary SCC to address the previously identified 50 risks 
due to costs and scheduling constraints. Moreover, there may not be enough 
resources within the organization to implement these SCC. In this case, 
management should list all those risks identified and determine how critical each 
individual risk is to the organization, while considering costs versus benefits 
 
 
analyses. Management must, therefore, explore new ways to determine and 
measure the relevancy of these SCC considering the constraints just presented.  
 
  Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks is another approach widely used by 
organizations to introduce minimum controls in organizations (Barnard & Von 
Solms, 2000). Saint-Germain (2005) states that best practice frameworks assist 
organizations in identifying appropriate SCC. Some best practices include: Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT), Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) Change Control, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), and Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE). Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) have mentioned 
other best practice frameworks which have also assisted in the identification and 
selection of SCC. These are: International Standardization Organization (ISO) / 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 27001 and 27002 and the 
Capability Maturity Model, among others.  
 
  The process of selecting the most effective set of SCC from these best practice 
frameworks can be challenging (Van der Haar & Von Solms, 2003). Van der Haar 
and Von Solms (2003) state that best practice frameworks leave the choosing of 
controls to the user, while offering little guidance in terms of determining the best 
controls to provide adequate protection for the particular business situation. 
Additionally, frameworks do not take into consideration organization specific 
constraints, such as, costs of implementation, scheduling, and resource constraints. 
Other less formal methods used in the past, such as, ad hoc or random approaches, 
could lead to the inclusion of unnecessary controls and/or exclusion of 
required/necessary controls (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000). Identifying and 
selecting SCC based on the above may result in organizations not being able to 
protect the overall confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information 
(Saint-Germain, 2005). In order to increase the effectiveness of the selection and 
prioritization process for SCC, new methods need to be developed that save time 
while considering major factors (e.g., constraints, restrictions, etc.) that 
undoubtedly affect the selection of SCC. 
 
  In another study, Gerber and Von Solms (2008) created a Legal Requirements 
Determination Model (LRDM) for defining legal requirements, which in turn, 
indicated relevant SCC to be selected from a list provided in the ISO/IEC 27002 
best practice framework to satisfy the identified legal requirements. Specifically, 
the authors: (1) developed a structured model to assist in establishing information 
security requirements from a legal perspective; (2) provided an interpretation of the 
legal source associated with information security requirements; and (3) proposed 
potential SCC from the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice framework to address the 
 
 
already identified legal information security requirements. Legal information 
security requirements were determined by devising and utilizing a legal compliance 
questionnaire in combination with a legal matrix that included mappings of legal 
aspects within each of the proposed legal categories to all related ISO/IEC 27002 
controls. Following determination of the legal requirements, a list of relevant SCC 
from the ISO/IEC 27002 framework was produced to satisfy the previously 
identified legal requirements. 
 
  Nonetheless, as evidenced earlier, the selection of SCC from baseline manuals or 
best practice frameworks, as it is the case with the LRDM using the ISO/IEC 27002 
framework, represents a weakness. Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks 
offer little guidance in terms of determining the best controls to provide adequate 
security for the particular business situation (Van der Haar & Von Solms, 2003). 
Furthermore, baseline manuals or frameworks do not necessarily take into 
consideration organization specific constraints, such as costs, scheduling, and 
resource constraints, among others. 
 
SOLUTION APPROACH 
 
  To properly evaluate the quality, significance, and priority of SCC in 
organizations, management must follow a methodology that takes into 
consideration the quality attributes of the SCC that are considered relevant. The 
methodology must provide capabilities to determine the relative importance of each 
identified quality attribute. This would allow the methodology to provide an SCC 
selection/prioritization scheme that represents how well these SCC meet quality 
attributes and how important those quality attributes are for the specific 
organization.  To achieve this, the methodology created in Otero, Otero, and 
Qureshi (2010) is modified and customized to solve the problem of prioritizing 
SCC in organizations. First, a set of quality attributes are identified as evaluation 
criteria for all possible SCC. These attributes are defined in terms of different 
features, where each feature is determined to be either present or not.  Once all 
features are identified, each individual SCC is evaluated against each feature using 
a simple binary (boolean) scale (i.e., 0 or 1). SCC that satisfy the highest number 
of features would expose a higher level of quality (or priority) for that particular 
quality attribute. Once all SCC are evaluated and measurements computed for all 
features, the proposed approach uses Desirability Functions to fuse all 
measurements into one unified value that is representative of the overall quality of 
the SCC. This unified value is computed by using a set of Desirability Functions 
that take into consideration the priority of each quality attribute. Therefore, the 
resulting priority of each SCC is derived based on management goals and 
organization needs. This results in an SCC evaluation/prioritization approach based 
 
 
on how well SCC meet quality attributes and how important those quality attributes 
are for the organization. 
 
DESIRABILITY FUNCTIONS 
 
  Desirability Functions are a popular approach for simultaneous optimization of 
multiple responses (Derringer & Suich, 1980; Montgomery, 2008). They have been 
used extensively in the literature for process optimization in industrial settings, 
where finding a set of operating conditions that optimize all responses for a 
particular system is desired (Otero, Otero, & Qureshi, 2010). Through Desirability 
Functions, each system response yi is converted into an individual function di that 
varies over the range 0 ≤  di ≤ 1, where di = 1 when a goal is met, and di = 0 
otherwise (Montgomery, 2008). Once each response is transformed, the levels of 
each factor are typically chosen to maximize the overall desirability which is 
represented as the geometric mean of all m transformed responses (Derringer & 
Suich, 1980). Alternatively, when factors are uncontrollable, the overall desirability 
value can be used to characterize the system based on the multiple selected criteria. 
 
  Similar to the characterization of industrial processes, the evaluation of the quality 
and prioritization of each SCC in organizations can be approached by finding the 
set of criteria that provide the optimal benefit versus cost value for a particular 
organization. When formulated this way, Desirability Functions can be used to 
provide a unified measurement that characterizes the quality of SCC based on a set 
of predefined evaluation criteria. Once the desirability of all SCC is computed, 
management can use this information to determine the relative priority of SCC and 
select the best ones simply by choosing the most desirable ones for the particular 
organization. 
 
Computing Desirability 
 
  The first step in the Desirability Functions approach involves identifying all 
possible SCC that could be implemented in an organization. These SCC can be 
obtained from the best practice frameworks as mentioned earlier. For instance, ITIL 
Change Control, COBIT, and/or ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002, all offer best practices 
or controls to help companies ensure that all program/system changes are 
appropriately managed, minimizing the likelihood of disruption, unauthorized 
alterations, and errors which may impact the accuracy, completeness, and valid 
processing and recording of financial information. Once selected, the results of 
these SCC are captured in the SCC vector, as presented in (4.1). 
 
 
 
 
(4.1)  
 
   
 
  Once the SCC vector is identified, each SCC can be evaluated against a set of 
quality attributes QA1, QA2,..,  QAn. The evaluation process takes place as follow. 
First, each quality attribute is defined in terms of m features, where m > 1. The 
evaluation scale for each feature is binary; that is, the feature is evaluated as being 
present/true (i.e., 1) or missing/false (i.e., 0).  For example, SCC can be prioritized 
based on their scope. In other words, SCC that effectively minimize the likelihood 
of disruption, unauthorized alterations, and errors impacting the accuracy, 
completeness, and validity of processing and recording of financial information in 
many systems (i.e., more than one system) have a higher priority than SCC that 
address the above in a smaller number of systems. In this case, the quality attribute 
scope can be defined with the following features: System 1, System 2, ..., System n.  
Therefore, the highest priority SCC (based on the scope quality attribute) would be 
one where System 1 = 1, System 2 = 1, and System n = 1. Similarly, the lowest 
priority SCC based on the scope quality attribute is one where System 1 = 0, System 
2 = 0, and System n = 0.  For quality attributes where the presence of features 
affects change management practices negatively (e.g., restrictions, penalties, etc.), 
the reverse is true.  In these cases, SCC with all features present (i.e., 1) result in 
lower priority and SCC with all features missing (i.e., 0) will result in higher 
priority. With this framework in place, a measurement of the importance of the jth 
SCC based on the ith quality attribute (e.g., scope) can be computed using (4.2), 
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where m is the number of features identified for the ith quality attribute. This 
computation normalizes the evaluation criteria to a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 
represents the lowest score and 100 the highest (backwards for restrictions or 
penalties). The overall assessment of the SCC set based on all quality attributes is 
captured using the quality assessment matrix Q presented in (4.3). As seen, each yij 
value of the matrix represents the score of the jth SCC based on each individual ith 
quality attribute. It is important to point out that the quality assessment matrix can 
be extended to evaluate SCC based on any quality attributes containing numerous 
features. 
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  Finally, to assess the importance of each quality attribute, a weight vector W is 
created where ri represents the importance of the QAi quality attribute using the 
scale 0 – 10, where 0 represents lowest importance and 10 represents highest 
importance. The weight vector W is presented in (4.4).  
 
 
 
(4.4) 
 
 
 
  Once the information from X, Q, and W is collected, desirability values for each 
SCC can be computed using the desirability matrix d presented in (4.5). As seen, 
each dij value of the matrix represents the desirability of the j
th SCC based on each 
individual iih quality attribute. 
 
  
 
(4.5) 
 
 
 
  Each individual desirability value dij for the SCC is computed according to 
management based on the organization’s specific needs, goals, and objectives. For 
example, quality attributes that are represented positively by a higher yij value are 
transformed using the maximization function in (4.6) (Montgomery, 2008). 
Alternatively, quality attributes that are represented negatively by a higher yij value 
are transformed using the minimization function in (4.7) (Montgomery, 2008), 
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where L and U are the lower and upper limits, respectively, T is the target objective 
(e.g., 100 for maximization, 0 for minimization), and ri is the desirability weight 
for the ith quality attribute. It is important to note that (4.6) and (4.7) are the normal 
equations for the Desirability Function approach. However, through 
experimentation, it was found that the approach for SCC selection and prioritization 
performed better when dij > 0. Therefore, as heuristic, when dij is less than .0001, 
the dij value is set to .0001. A desirability weight of r = 1 results in a linear 
Desirability Function; however, when r > 1, curvature is exposed by the 
Desirability Function to emphasize on being close to the target objective (T). When 
0 < r < 1, being close to the target objective is less important.  Once individual 
desirability values for each quality attribute are computed, the overall SCC 
desirability value can be computed using (4.8). As seen, each overall desirability 
value is computed as the geometric mean of all m individual desirability values for 
SCC 1, 2, …, n. 
 
  
 
 
(4.8) 
  
 
 
   
 
 
  After overall desirability values are computed for all SCC, management can use 
these values as a priority measurement derived from the predefined quality 
attributes and their relative importance for the particular organization. 
 
CASE ASSESSMENT 
 
  This section presents the results of a SCC evaluation/prioritization case 
assessment using the proposed approach applied in the context of a fictitious 
organization implementing ISO/IEC 27002, an international cybersecurity 
management standard. The organizational requirement is to determine the most 
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effective SCC in order to mitigate risks to financial information. We generated 
simulated data for cybersecurity quality attributes and features for the input matrix. 
The simulated data represents real-life operational data from an organization’s 
cybersecurity program. Overall, the case evaluates any 10 SCC based on the 
following identified quality attributes, some of which have been defined within the 
ISO/IEC 177995 and 27002 standards (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Nachin, 
Tangmanee, & Piromsopa, 2019; ISACA, 2009).  
 
1. Restrictions – There are restrictions that management must take into 
account before selecting and implementing SCC. These may include 
whether the costs involved in the selection and implementation of the SCC 
are high, whether resources are not available, and whether there are 
scheduling constraints associated with implementing the SCC. The 
presence of any of the above will negatively affect the specific quality 
attribute. That is, SCC with all features present will result in a lower 
priority; conversely, SCC with all features missing will result in a higher 
priority. A high priority scenario will be one where the implementation cost 
of the specific SCC is considered adequate and manageable (e.g., within 
budget), resources are available to implement the particular SCC, and there 
are no restrictions in terms of scheduling the SCC (i.e., the SCC can be 
scheduled anytime during the year). Restrictions is defined as: Costs (C), 
Availability of Resources (AoR), and Scheduling (T). 
2. Scope – This quality attribute assesses the impact of the SCC on the 
organization. SCC that effectively minimize the likelihood of disruption, 
unauthorized alterations, and errors which impact the accuracy, 
completeness, as well as validity and recording of financial information in 
many systems have a higher priority than SCC that address the above in a 
smaller number of systems. Scope is defined as: System 1 (S1), System 2 
(S2), …, System n (Sn). 
3. Organization’s Objectives – Refers to the number of business goals and 
objectives the SCC satisfies. The higher the number of objectives the SCC 
satisfies, the higher the desirability of the SCC. Organization’s objectives is 
defined with the following features: Objective 1 (O1), Objective 2 (O2), …, 
Objective n (On). 
4. Access Controls – Implementation of an SCC for this quality attribute will 
promote appropriate levels of change management access controls to ensure 
protection of the organization’s systems and applications against 
unauthorized activities. Organizations may implement network access 
controls (N), operating systems access controls (O), and application 
controls (A) based on their specific needs.  
 
 
5. Human Resources – Implementation of SCC support reductions of 
unauthorized access, inadequate change implementations, fraud, or misuse 
of computer resources by promoting information security awareness (Aw), 
training (Tn), and education of employees (E). Depending on the particular 
situation, costs involved, and availability of personnel, organizations may 
select which of these to employ.  
6. Communications and Operations Management – SCC will ensure the 
correct and secure operation of information processing facilities, which 
includes addressing for adequate segregation of duties (SoD), change 
management (CM), and network security (NS). Organizations may select 
SCC to address all of these or just some depending on their particular needs. 
7. Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance – SCC will support 
security related to the organization’s in-house and/or off-the-shelf systems 
or applications (e.g., ensure personnel with authorized access can move 
changes into production environments, etc.). The higher the number of 
systems or applications addressed by the SCC, the higher the desirability of 
the SCC. Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance is defined 
as: Systems or Applications 1 (SoA1), Systems or Applications 2 (SoA2), 
…, and Systems or Applications n (SoAn). 
8. Incident Management – Incident Management ensures that security-related 
incidents (e.g., attempts to change/manipulate financial data, etc.) identified 
within the organization’s processing of information are communicated in a 
timely manner and that corrective action is taken for any exceptions 
identified. Incident management may apply to online processing and/or 
batch processing. Incident Management is defined as Processing 1 (P1), 
Processing 2 (P2), …, and Processing n (Pn). 
 
  Using synthetic data for the identified quality attributes, binary input evaluation 
(Table 1), and Desirability Functions parameters (Table 2), results were generated 
from executing the Desirability Functions and presented in Table 3. As seen in 
Table 2, all lower and upper boundaries are set to 0 and 100, respectively. Also, all 
quality attributes have been identified as having equal priority. This is 
accomplished by setting the weight r = 1 for all quality attributes. Finally, different 
target values have been identified for each quality attribute.  This means that the 
threshold for achieving 100% desirability is customized for each quality attribute. 
For example, quality attributes where T = 70 are considered 100% desirable if they 
exhibit 70% (or more) of the features that define them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Binary Input Evaluation. 
 
 QA1 = Restrictions QA2 = Scope 
QA3 = Organization's 
Objectives 
QA4 = Access 
Controls 
C AoR T S1 S2 Sn O1 O2 On N O A 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
4 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
6 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
9 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
10 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
Table 1. Binary Input Evaluation. (Cont’d) 
 
 
QA5 = Human 
Resources 
QA6 = 
Communications and 
Operations 
Management 
QA7 = Systems 
Acquisition, Development, 
and Maintenance 
QA8 = Incident 
Management 
Aw Tn E SoD CM NS SoA1 SoA2 SoAn P1 P2 Pn 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
3 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
5 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
8 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
9 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
10 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Desirability Function Parameters. 
 
 QA1 = Restrictions 
QA2 = 
Scope 
QA3 = Organization's 
Objectives 
QA4 = Access 
Controls 
L 0 0 0 0 
U 100 100 100 100 
T 50 70 100 60 
r 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 2. Desirability Function Parameters. (Cont’d) 
 
 QA5 = Human 
Resources 
QA6 = Communications 
and Operations 
Management 
QA7 = Systems 
Acquisition, 
Development, and 
Maintenance 
QA8 = Incident 
Management 
L 0 0 0 0 
U 100 100 100 100 
T 70 40 40 40 
r 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 3. Desirability Function Results. 
 
 QA1 = Restrictions QA2 = Scope 
QA3 = Organization's 
Objectives 
QA4 = Access 
Controls 
C AoR T S1 S2 Sn O1 O2 On N O A 
1 1.0000 0.9524 1.0000 1.0000 
2 1.0000 0.4762 0.6667 1.0000 
3 0.6667 0.9524 0.6667 1.0000 
4 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333 0.5556 
5 0.6667 0.9524 0.3333 1.0000 
6 1.0000 0.9524 1.0000 0.5556 
7 0.6667 0.0014 1.0000 1.0000 
8 0.6667 0.9524 0.6667 1.0000 
9 0.6667 0.4762 0.3333 1.0000 
10 0.6667 0.4762 0.3333 1.0000 
 
 
Table 3. Desirability Function Results. (Cont’d) 
 
 
QA5 = 
Human 
Resources 
QA6 = 
Communications 
and Operations 
Management 
QA7 = Systems 
Acquisition, 
Development, and 
Maintenance 
QA8 = 
Incident 
Management 
Desirability 
Aw Tn E SoD CM NS SoA1 SoA2 SoAn P1 P2 Pn 
1 0.9524 0.8333 1.0000 1.0000 89.27% 
2 0.9524 0.8333 0.0025 1.0000 40.60% 
3 0.9524 1.0000 1.0000 0.8333 42.78% 
4 0.4762 0.8333 1.0000 0.8333 73.32% 
5 0.4762 0.8333 0.8333 1.0000 35.94% 
6 0.0014 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 44.75% 
7 0.9524 0.8333 1.0000 0.8333 43.85% 
8 0.4762 0.8333 1.0000 1.0000 81.58% 
9 0.4762 0.8333 1.0000 1.0000 33.95% 
10 0.4762 0.0025 0.8333 1.0000 36.13% 
 
  As evidenced, each SCC has been evaluated using the identified features for each 
quality attribute. The binary input scale is used to determine the presence of 
features. Using the proposed approach, the most desirable SCC (based on Table 3) 
is SCC 1 (highest Desirability), followed by SCC 8, SCC 4, and so on. It is 
important to notice that the evaluation of SCC using this approach is fully 
dependent on the particular scenario at hand. In this case assessment, the results are 
based on the parameters configured in Table 2. However, if changed to reflect more 
priority on different quality attributes, the results would vary from the ones 
presented in Table 3. In addition, different applications of the approach can contain 
numerous features, which make it fully customizable for practical applications.  
 
CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
  The research presented in this paper develops an innovative approach for 
evaluating the quality of SCC in organizations based on a multiple quality 
evaluation criteria. Specifically, it presents a methodology that uses Desirability 
Functions to create a unified measurement that represents how well SCC meet 
quality attributes and how important the quality attributes are for the organization. 
Through a case assessment, the approach is proven successful in providing a way 
for measuring the quality of SCC for specific organizations. 
 
  There are several important contributions from this research. First, the approach 
is simple and readily available for implementation using a spreadsheet. This can 
promote usage in practical scenarios, where highly complex methodologies for 
SCC selection are impractical. Second, the approach fuses multiple evaluation 
 
 
criteria and features to provide a holistic view of the overall SCC quality. Third, 
the approach is easily extended to include additional quality attributes not 
considered within this research. Finally, the approach provides a mechanism to 
evaluate the quality of SCC in various domains. By modifying the parameters of 
the Desirability Functions, quality of SCC can be evaluated by considering only the 
quality attributes that are necessary for the organization. Overall, the approach 
presented in this research proved to be a feasible technique for organizations to 
effectively and efficiently evaluate the quality of SCC over their financial 
information. 
 
  Regarding future research work, criteria factors (targeting other specific 
organizations' restrictions, goals, regulations, etc.) can be added to improve the 
current investigation. In addition, experts from similar industries or organizations 
may be interviewed to identify a more accurate set of evaluation criteria that can 
potentially be utilized as guidelines, policies, or procedures for the organization 
under evaluation. To extend the research, results from this paper can be examined 
and compared to SCC assessment results from other similar organizations. A 
further opportunity would utilize a hybrid approach (i.e., Desirability Functions 
combined with other traditional methodologies) to assess SCC. A hybrid approach 
can certainly strengthen current SCC evaluation processes in organizations.    
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